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is treated in 90 pages, using, among other concepts, a translation into flowchart 
programs. Finally, total correctness of tail-recursive procedures is treated in 50 pages 
by means of a translation into while-programs. 
Of course, the soundness proof of the rules for total correctness of while-programs 
with respect to the operational semantics is not trivial and, in constructing a proof, 
one might be tempted to use a translation into flowchart programs. The treatment 
in the book, however, seems to convey a different message: in order to really 
understand while-programs we must understand flowchart programs first. 
When the author occasionally enters the field of programming methodology (e.g. 
in Section 1.5), he looks for an invariant after the repetition (guard and body) has 
been written. By now, it should be known that one obtains better programs and 
easier proofs if one begins by looking for an invariant and uses the invariant to 
obtain the repetition. 
In the chapters on total correctness of while-programs, the author uses Hoare 
triples, translation into flowchart programs, operational semantics and natural 
deduction. It seems to be all sound and possibly complete, but it leads to an inefficient 
way of reasoning. The chapter on tail-recursive procedures uses denotational seman- 
tics, cpo’s and least fixpoints. Since the semantics is completely deterministic, a 
procedure specification must contain a complete list of the values of the output 
variables in terms of the values of the input variables. This seems an undesirable 
restriction in real programming. 
Despite all its formality, the book shows a certain lack of abstraction. For instance, 
Exercise 13 of Chapter 4 reads: “Modify the syntax, operation semantics, and Hoare 
axiomatization of this chapter to permit the use of more than one stack.” 
The treatment of the subject is sound, but this approach should not be used 
anymore. We must hope for better books to sell the ideas of program correctness. 
Wim H. HESSELINK 
University of Groningen 
Groningen, Netherlands 
The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century Survey. Edited by Rolf Herken. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1988, Price L55.00 (hardback), ISBN 
O-19-8537417. 
This massive (over 650 pages) book has been compiled to commemorate the 50th 
Anniversary of the publication of Alan Turing’s paper, “On Computable Numbers, 
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” In words of RoIf Herken, the 
volume’s editor, 
. . . it presented the invention of the universal Turing machine. It is the 
publication of this idea that will presumably be acknowledged as marking 
sub specie aeternitatis the beginning of the “computer age.” 
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The list of 27 contributors of 28 papers contained in the volume includes a number 
of luminaries, quite a few papers are very well written, some less so. 
The book is organized in two parts. Part I contains a biographical sketch (Andrew 
Hodges), a popular essay on mathematical logic and computers (Martin Davis) and 
three analyses of Turing’s mathematical achievements. 
Solomon Feferman considers Turing’s work on ordinal logics (the subject of 
Turing’s Ph.D. dissertation); his conclusion that Turing “did not really have his 
heart in the Ph.D. work under Church” seems very well founded. 
Stephen C. Kleene contributed a paper on Turing’s analysis of computability. 
This is a curiously uneven contribution. It starts with a beautifully written and very 
easily accessible introduction on algorithms and the notion of (Turing’s) computabil- 
ity, including a carefully stated version of Turing’s Thesis. Then-quite naturally, 
if we recall Kleene’s own historic contributions to mathematics-it steers towards 
genera1 recursivity and arithmetical hierarchies. It would be fascinating to follow 
this path in detail. Unfortunately, the rhythm of the presentation accelerates merci- 
lessly, and the latter half of Kleene’s paper consists almost solely of theorems and 
references to their proofs, primarily contained in the author’s classic, Introduction 
to Metamathematics (first published in 1952). 
The central paper of Part I (and the longest one in the entire volume) is written 
by Robin Candy, who paints a pointillistic picture of the intellectual landscape of 
1930’s mathematics and-against this background from which almost simultaneously 
emerged equivalent contributions by Church, Kleene, Post and Turing-tries to 
answer “why Turing’s work has proved to be of greater mathematical and philo- 
sophical significance than that of the other authors.” This very well written (almost 
dramatized), wittily provocative and (dare I say?) iconoclastic article should be 
studied by all interested in relationships between logic, computing, philosophy and 
mathematics (preferably before they add to the confusion !). 
Apart from an occasional careless inclusion of an ill-founded platitude (such as: 
“ . . . binary number system, which of course has turned out to be fundamental for 
computer science . . . ,” or: “There is no doubt that the work of 1936, more par- 
ticularly Turing’s paper, influenced the design and development of high speed digital 
computers.“), the only serious shortcoming of Part I of the book is the contributors’ 
unwillingness (or, perhaps, inability, caused by the still unlifted shroud of secrecy 
covering Turing’s war-time work) to address the amazing and quite frightening 
transformation of a brilliant mathematician, who liked to use a mechanical metaphor, 
into a seemingly obsessed prophet of “intelligent machinery.” Gandy rightly observes 
that Turing’s pre-war results would lose nothing in significance ifthe word “machine” 
was removed from them: their technical content would stand on its own. I am 
haunted by a dark suspicion that Turing consistently suppressed the significant 
(technical) parts of his post-war contributions on computing, that he felt (or was) 
free to publish only their metaphoric shell. 
Part II of the book is far too diverse for me to attempt a comprehensive review. 
It certainly contains some papers which I found interesting and from which I learned 
about amusing developments. I am sure that other readers will find similarly 
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rewarding papers too, but, naturally, their preferences and mine need not coincide. 
I believe that by the original design the papers collected in Part II were meant to 
illustrate the influence of Turing’s work on contemporary research. In reality, quite 
a few do not include any reference to Turing’s papers, some do not even mention 
his name. The Editor’s actual criteria (if any) in composing this part of the book 
are hard to fathom; it is difficult to defy the impression that a number of random 
factors have played their usual role. 
By subject domains, the articles in Part II range from linguistics to physics, from 
philosophy to computer architecture. By the level of presentation, they range from 
popular, general essays (such as could be printed in a science section of a Sunday 
paper) to highly technical, requiring thorough familiarity with specialised symbolics 
and/or literature, not always referred to explicitly. (In this respect, David Finkelstein 
in his “Finite Physics” is probably the worst, but not the only, offender.) 
As I see it, far too many papers in Part II take that what I call the metaphoric 
shell of Turing’s post-war publications for an unquestionable revelation and reck- 
lessly extend it: the thought processes are an implementation of Turing Machines 
(TMs), people contain TMs. To quote an example (from Oswald Wiener’s “Form 
and Content in Thinking Turing Machines”): 
An organism is a set of TMs that are capable of constructing, modifying 
and coupling (concatenating, fusing, inserting, composing, indexing) 
TMs as well as of activating (“calling”) one another and the newly 
constructed ones. (p. 636) 
. . . the sentence “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day” in a human 
addressee’s organism will usually initiate a complicated process that 
involves orientation in the surroundings, some variant of its model of 
the speaker (mainly models of the speaker’s actual running environ- 
ment), its models of summer and of day, and diverse models of coupling 
those models or parts thereof.. . (p. 641). 
However, not all contributions to Part II subscribe to such extreme views. I was 
relieved to find also these two quotes: 
Many processes in nature must be such that we cannot understand them 
in terms of a computer program and at the same time put our understand- 
ing to the test by running the program on a machine. Brain processes 
of intelligence fall into this category, since the brain is a product of 
evolution and thus cannot be structurally programmable. (Michel 
Conrad, “The Price of Programmability,” p. 305). 
Computing does not deal with the creation of notational systems. Neither 
does it deal with the mechanism of how we (or machines) assimilate 
the meaning of a notational system. This rather trivial remark seems to 
be fundamental when we want to speak of the mechanization of intel- 
ligence. (Johan A. Makowsky, “Mental Images and the Architecture of 
Concepts,” p. 457.) 
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I felt a lot of sympathy with the general drift of Roger Penrose’s enjoyable paper, 
“On the Physics and Mathematics of Thought” (an abbreviated and preliminary 
version of a book, The Emperor’s New Mind, to be published “in due course” 
by Oxford University Press), in which a number of arguments against the thesis 
that “mental activity is merely the enacting of an algorithm” are carefully 
presented. 
I cannot resist the temptation to mention one more contribution, utterly incon- 
gruous as it is. Donald Michie criticizing the (Japanese) Fifth Generation Plan for 
the lack of sufficiently firm foundations is a read not to be missed. (In case my 
readers wonder what is the exact relation between Turing and any gaps in The 
Fifth Generation Plan, let me hasten to say that I do not know, but Michie’s paper 
starts with a quotation from Turing’s 1950 Lecture to the London Mathematical 
Society.) 
A tighter editorial control would have probably resulted in a thinner volume, one 
that would carry a clearer message. A little extra editorial work may have helped 
the readers. (I missed a name index and would have loved to have a subject index, 
perhaps even a glossary.) In a so-expensively produced book, a relatively large 
number of typographic errors is surprising, the inattention to spelling conventions 
irritating (in a single paper one can find algol, Algol, ALGOL, Pascal and FORT- 
RAN). The policy of always surrounding by commas each occurrence of “i.e.” 
results in some hilarious parsing, but thanks to the advanced technology of DTP 
was irresistably easy to implement. 
Wlad TURSKI 
University of Warsaw 
Warsaw. Poland 
Communication and Concurrency. By R. Milner. Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hempstead, 
UK, 1989, Price X17.95 (hardback), ISBN O-13-115007-3. 
This is an excellent book indeed. It is a development and refinement of the earlier 
monograph, A Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS), written by the same 
author, which is one of the basic and most important theories for concurrent systems. 
CCS was propounded thirteen years ago and it has inspired a school of researchers 
throughout the world. This book contains a new formulation of the process calculus 
written by the original author of the theory. The new chapters deal with the 
synchronous calculus and with a modal logic for specification. The book is aimed 
at not only computer scientists interested in theory of concurrency but also at 
designers of real systems and students of computer science courses. There are over 
a hundred exercises distributed through the text, as well as several examples of 
applications of the theory. 
